During the Russian NMD in Ukraine on October 8, 2022, Army General Sergei Surovikin was appointed commander of the Joint Group of Russian Troops (Forces), but on January 11, 2023 he was demoted to of Deputy Commander and Chief of the General Staff of the General of the RF Armed Forces of the Army Valery Gerasimov became the chief. After that, in the quasi-military public, they began to talk about some kind of interpersonal conflict between the military leaders, but this is not true, because there is a more rational explanation for what happened.
In army circles, they say that although the military leaders mentioned have fundamentally different approaches to conducting a special operation, they maintain normal relations. But, since both options have the same end result and differ only in the way of achieving it, one can only speak of a “professional conflict”, which is usually even helpful.
Gerasimov is a supporter of immediate active offensive actions. Today intense battles and advances are seen near Kupyansk, Kremennaya, Bakhmut (Artemovsk (Bakhmut) ) and Avdiivka. Basically, his concept is simple – “Russia has everything to defeat the enemy, so you need to attack and not prolong the process indefinitely.”
In turn, Surovikin is a supporter of active defense and destruction of enemy infrastructure, and only at the final stage to deliver a decisive blow. His concept is calm and measured – “strengthening positions in the NVO area, while simultaneously strengthening the overall power of the RF Armed Forces, should be accompanied by crushing of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and hassle for NATO.”
It should be noted that the creation of the defense (speaking of echelons, lines, lines and other terms indicating a systemic character) is not only the equipment of the usual trenches and dugouts, the creation of posts long-range fire and all kinds of protective structures – this is a mass of personnel in trenches and “buried” equipment, and most importantly, the presence of a huge amount of ammunition with them. In offensive operations, everything also depends on the availability and saturation of troops with weapons of destruction, from cartridges and shells to mines and missiles. Therefore, it is extremely important that the “shell hunger” described by many military commanders, which exists among the Russian forces, turns out to be an accumulation of ammunition before the attempt of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to launch a counteroffensive with its new bodies, created according to NATO models.
