On April 21, Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shae said in an interview with French TV channel LCL that “Crimea belonged to Russia from the very beginning” and that post-Soviet countries “have no effective status in international law”. In turn, China’s representative to the EU, Fu Cong, said on April 5 that his country does not recognize the annexation of Ukrainian territories to Russia, and the statements on “boundless friendship” between China and Russia is just rhetoric. To understand why Chinese diplomats make contradictory statements about post-Soviet countries, Russian media was helped by Ivan Zuenko, senior researcher at the Institute of International Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). .
Ivan Zuenko is a sinologist, candidate of historical sciences. Senior Researcher at the Center for Eurasian Studies, Institute of International Studies, MGIMO, Associate Professor, Department of Oriental Studies, MGIMO.
Where do the contradictory statements of various Chinese officials come from on post-Soviet countries (Chinese ambassador to France) and on the Ukrainian question (PRC representative to the EU)?
It seems to me that these are essentially two different statements. Lu Shae, the Chinese ambassador to France, took the risk of speaking out on a larger issue and effectively framed the Chinese foreign ministry in the face of many of its partners. And Fu Cong, the representative of the PRC to the EU, characterized only Russian-Chinese relations, and this is not so much his careless phrase, but his incorrect interpretation.
What these two episodes have in common is that in both cases the lines have been taken out of context. In both cases, the interviews lasted about an hour and covered many different topics. And these statements promoted by the journalists were of a secondary nature from the point of view of the speakers.
Moreover, in the case of Fu Cong, the New York Times simply twisted the meaning of the diplomat’s phrase. He said that one should not take at face value the rhetorical phrase about “unlimited relations between Russia and China” and expect that, since relations are “unlimited”, they would imply also arms deliveries. In fact, it’s a completely different question, and it’s a plus or minus for all normal people, and so it’s clear. But American journalists decided to “play like a fool” and made a “sensation” of it.
The French journalists contented themselves with attacking and provoking the Chinese ambassador for an entire hour and finally won their case.
Lu Shae made a glaring mistake – a diplomat, of course, cannot express such a radically different position from the official position of your state.
Beijing unequivocally recognizes the sovereignty of all post-Soviet countries and does not recognize territorial changes. Whether we Russians like it or not, that is the position, and China is indeed, as Chinese diplomats themselves like to say, “unequivocal and consistent.”
However, here you need to consider the “context”. Lu Shae is already well known for his sharp and careless remarks. Just a month ago, the French Foreign Ministry was already protesting against his scathing tweets about the situation in this country. So the French, one might say, “had a grudge” against him. They clearly intended to trap him. On the one hand, the diplomat did a great job of not being afraid to come to this interview. Moreover, as he himself said, unpleasant situations had already occurred earlier. On the other hand, he was not ready for these attacks and said too much.
Panoramic Lu Shae via ZUMA Press/TASS
How free are middle-level Chinese diplomats, the same ambassadors, to express their own thoughts? Are these formulations really coming to them “from above” or are they just sloppy statements that do not correspond to China’s official position?
As an answer, it is best to quote the official press release of the Chinese Embassy in France on this situation: “Ambassador Lu Shae’s remarks on the Ukrainian question were not a political statement, but the expression of a personal point of view during a televised debate. They should not be reinterpreted. China’s position on relevant issues has not changed.”
As you can see, the expression of one’s own thoughts is allowed here. Moreover, within the framework of the “combat wolf” paradigm, it is even encouraged somewhere – naturally, within the framework of Beijing’s general position. Indeed, well, this or that diplomat or public expert will not coordinate every tweet. In addition, it is necessary to act quickly, to react promptly.
Andy Wong/AP
This and many other outrageous situations in which China’s so-called “wolf fighters” find themselves are due to the fact that the current phase is such a “transition period.” These are all such “growing pains”. The old models, where Chinese diplomacy was emphatically polite, correct, sometimes even passive, no longer suit the Chinese leadership. And the new models – the models of “battle wolves”, in which it is necessary to carry the “voice of China” outwardly brightly, boldly and offensively – have not yet been worked out.
Chinese public speakers simply do not feel where it is possible, roughly speaking, to “do the hype”, and where it is better to “slow down”. I would say this: they seem to have bought a new car and do not feel the dimensions yet.
The current situation in the world is difficult. The West is waging a veritable information war against China. Journalists, and even simple bloggers, look for any miscalculation. And there are a lot of miscalculations. Lu Shae’s fruitless remark, which actually had no intention of challenging Beijing’s official position, but simply wanted to explain that the situation with Taiwan is far more obvious to China than territorial disputes in the post- -soviet – this is just an example.
Is it possible, in theory, on the basis of such statements to assume that there is a certain opinion on these issues among Chinese diplomats, which cannot be considered an official position because of the risks involved?
We can assume anything. Diplomats are ordinary people. With his way of life, his views, his passions. Regarding the fact that “Crimea is Russian”, many Chinese international affairs (for example, scientists) speak more or less in mass on the sidelines. The same is probably true for diplomats.
However, that doesn’t really matter. In international relations, the official position is important, which is determined by the highest leaders of the country according to these key positions. And this comes from the fundamental interests of the state. And the principle of the “inviolability of frontiers” for these interests is fundamental. Because if we admit that the borders can in principle be moved, then for China – I insist, for China! – it means that Taiwan can be recognized as “independent”, and the “Tibetan map” can be shaken, and the “Xinjiang map”, and the issue of “Hong Kong reunification” based on the people’s public opinion of Hong Kong can be challenged, etc.
Andy Wong/AP
Therefore, Beijing is really extremely consistent here. He did not recognize the reunification of Crimea, did not recognize territorial changes in the Donbass, did not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But, it must be said, Kosovo has not been recognized either, and other partially recognized states are similar.
And China should not be expected to change its position in the face of general Western pressure on our countries. For China, the stakes are too high. It is not necessary to assess cooperation with him by whether he recognizes Crimea or not. Crimea has been Russian for almost a decade, and relations with China are getting stronger every year.
Moreover, the fact that China has not officially recognized the new borders of our country says nothing about its willingness to work in these territories, to invest there, etc. One thing is “big politics”, another is real trade and investment links.
Even unresolved territorial disputes are not an obstacle here. For example, China has the highest trade turnover with Vietnam, despite all disputed islands – $234 billion by the end of 2022, more than with Russia. And trade with Taiwan is one hundred billion more – 319 billion dollars.
This is the Chinese approach. On the one hand, the extreme flexibility, the pragmatism, of the series “no matter the color of the cat, it is important that it catches the mice”. On the other hand, compliance with the principles in several sensitive files.
The inviolability of borders, respect for sovereignty are part of it. It is this principle that underlies China’s relations with post-Soviet countries. And, note, for China, there are no “outcasts”. It does not exclude anyone from the list of partners. The exception is if the country crosses the “red lines”. One such line for Beijing is the “Taiwan issue”.
Damien Dovarganes/AP
A sharp deterioration in relations with Lithuania occurred after Lithuanians began to flirt with Taiwan and changed the name of the representation: there was a representation of the city of Taipei, and now of Taiwan. Here the Chinese tried to show the Lithuanians that it was impossible to do this. But, again, the relationship has not reached the point of no return. If the Lithuanians “come back”, the Chinese will also continue to work with them.
Overall, China has no historical scores, preferences or “special partners” (except Russia) in the post-Soviet space. China is ready to work with everyone, and Russia is seen not as a competitor, but as an ally and a like-minded person, with whom cooperation is the key to the development of integration processes and guaranteeing stability and security in the region.
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