“What should Russia’s maritime containment in the High North look like? What is the right balance between containment without escalating the conflict in the Arctic? And above all, what lessons can we draw at sea and in the Far North from the Ukrainian conflict? – These questions are posed by retired Admiral James Foggo, Dean of the Center for Maritime Strategy, during a panel meeting held February 9, 2023 at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC.
The discussion was titled: “Deterring Russia at Sea in the High North”. Mark Green, director of the Woodrow Wilson Center, opened the meeting with words explaining the topic’s relevance: “During the Cold War, the Arctic region was a key theater of operations in which nuclear strategy was developed and improved.” Consequently, “today’s Russian attempts to restore empire across Europe” force the world community to think back to the Arctic, where “new generations of intercontinental missiles and stealth submarines have again drew attention to naval operations”.
Admiral Green pointed out that while a number of branches and branches of the armed forces of the Russian armed forces suffered significant losses and suffered degradation as a result of the war in Ukraine (tank troops, artillery, infantry, in part aviation, to a large extent the Black Sea Fleet), then the main components of the army The Russian Navy, which includes Russian nuclear submarines, is completely spared hostilities: “It is worrying “, says Admiral Green. – First of all, the Northern Fleet remains unchanged. Russia is producing submarines at a very rapid rate, and these submarines are of high quality. Russia is now trying to achieve parity with the USS Virginia class; it has not yet been reached, but the difference between them is already very small.
According to Admiral Green, Russia’s new BS-329 Belgorod class submarines, nuclear-powered torpedoes and Poseidon nuclear warheads can pose a threat to American security. Also of concern are the “reconnaissance and sabotage functions of deep-sea nuclear-powered mini-submarines, which could potentially endanger our critical underwater infrastructure, as 95% of commercial and military information is transmitted via submarine cables. sailors in the world and, in particular, on the other side of the Atlantic.”
“Russia has expanded and modernized twelve of its Arctic bases and built three new ones,” said Admiral Green. Thus, the Arctic can again become a testing ground for new weapons systems – not only Russian, but also Chinese.
Michael Petersen, director of the Russian Maritime Studies Institute, US Naval War College, agrees: “The Russians see the Arctic both as their economic backbone and as a kind of base for their military efforts, not only in the Arctic region itself, but also in Western Europe. It’s their northern flank.” That’s why Michael Petersen calls high latitudes “a critical element of transatlantic security,” while adding that he’s expressing his personal expert view, not the opinion of the US Navy or the War College.
“In Ukraine, we learned that the Russians are quite capable of striking fixed civilian infrastructure and are ready to carry out such a campaign. As such, they can reliably target targets on both sides of the Atlantic at long ranges, although their ability to do so effectively becomes increasingly limited over time.
Returning to the policy of containment, Petersen explains figuratively: “It’s about carefully managing our relationship: if we have a neighbor who intends to break our fence, throw trash in our yard, or make something else like that, for example, giving his dog free to run around in our garden – we have to find a way to stop him.”
Egil Vasstrand, Naval Attaché and Deputy Defense Officer, Royal Norwegian Embassy in Washington, DC, generally agrees with this approach: “Following the Russian aggression in Ukraine, we have gained a better understanding of the extent to which the Russia is ready to go using military force to achieve its political goals. In light of such significant security changes, it would be only natural to reconsider current security practice.
Norway’s policy towards its eastern neighbor is typical: “We continue to engage with Russia in areas important to regional security and predictability, such as fisheries management, research and rescue in the event of incidents at sea,” says Egil Vastrand. “There is even a hotline between the Norwegian joint operational headquarters and the Russian Northern Fleet to avoid unnecessary escalations and misunderstandings.” However, the attaché points out, unlike Sweden and Finland, Norway has long been a member of NATO and is a key factor in the country’s security: “The Joint Force Command in Norfolk is a vital element for ensuring transatlantic communications and security”.
The Norwegian naval attache pointed out that “in recent years, Norway has seen examples of increasingly aggressive Russian behavior – simulated (training) attacks, aggressive operations during exercises, such as jamming GPS signals, which has repeatedly affected civilian air traffic in northern parts of Norway. . “It is quite likely,” Vastrand said, “that Russia will be prepared to use military force if it decides that its strategic interests here are threatened.” Norway’s population (less than 5.5 million) is less than 4% of Russia’s, so technical support and political support for military deterrence is of the utmost importance.
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine , the Russian side unilaterally reduced its international cooperation in the Arctic, which paved the way for a possible escalation. Chris Kofron, Director for Russia, National Security Council of the United States, says bitterly: “Most of us thought that the Arctic was the region where we could find a real ground for cooperation with the Russians; and we still believe it is. But Russia seems to have made cooperation in almost every area dependent on Ukraine’s support: this even extends to New START. We do not believe that Russia will cooperate in good faith with other Arctic countries, at least not yet.
“Since 2012, Russia has resumed the deployment of its nuclear submarines capable of striking ground targets in the Atlantic. Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, demonstrating its determination to project force when and where it chooses, says Vice Admiral Daniel Dwyer, commander of U.S. Second Fleet and Joint Force Command Norfolk (US Second Fleet; Commander, Joint Forces Command Norfolk). “The Atlantic was rapidly moving from an area of low voltage to a region that required our heightened attention.” This led to the fact that the US Second Fleet, whose area of responsibility includes the North Atlantic and which was abolished as a separate unit in 2011, was re-established in 2018, but already in close cooperation with the forces of the Arctic.
Vice Admiral Dwyer recalled that “in July 2022, Russia unveiled its new maritime doctrine, which makes the Arctic the most important maritime space. Previously, the Arctic was their number three priority, while the Atlantic was their number one priority. Russia understands that the Arctic is the key to its economy, to its defence, because it is seeing the melting of the Arctic ice cap. Nevertheless, in August last year, Russia unveiled its intention to build a new strategic submarine for operations in the Atlantic.
Chris Kofron, however, does not overestimate Russia’s ability to dominate the high latitudes: “We tend to see what’s happening as a restoration of Soviet-era capabilities, not a buildup, because the infrastructure of Russia has atrophied so much. after the collapse of the USSR they really needed to restore what they used to be in the area. It remains to be seen to what extent Russia will be able to pay particular attention to the Arctic in the future: since last February, Russia has lost a large part of its military potential in Ukraine, it will take time to restore it, which could take decades. And the war is not over yet… Russia generally tends to privilege strategic and nuclear potential to the detriment of other areas. Therefore, we will likely see continued investments in strategic and other submarines, as well as strategic infrastructure, including in the North.
“The problem with the Arctic is that the Kremlin has mythologized itself for decades as a super-country, as an Arctic civilization,” remarks wittily Mathieu Boulègue, member of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Royal Institute. of International Affairs UK. International Affairs, “Chatham House”). The propaganda myth about the people – the great conqueror of the North, the Far East, the oceans, the Arctic and the Antarctic – was on par with the myths about NATO, seeking to “s ‘extend’ and conquer Russia, and other similar legends. This set of false narratives formed “an envelope containing the contents of Putin’s 20-year information war”, says Matyu Buleg. “That’s why the Arctic is so important to Russia: the psychology of threat and ‘fortress beleaguered’, the irrational fear of being surrounded, hasn’t changed much since Soviet times.”
Chris Kofron agrees with the socio-psychological context: “There is a problem with Russia believing that the Arctic belongs to them, or at least that they have some sort of primacy there. Let us remember the spectacle of hoisting the flag on the seabed a few years ago… We also recall that in November last year, Russia passed a law according to which Russian authorization is required for the passage of foreign warships along the Northern Sea Route. Some of the regions of the Arctic Ocean, Russia calls its internal waters. This complicates the already difficult operating environment in the Arctic. At the very least, Moscow wants to control the northern sea route.
However, experts agree that “Arctic escalation is a byproduct of tensions not occurring in the Arctic itself, but elsewhere, and there is a very low probability that the conflict breaks out in the Arctic itself,” Kofron said. said.
Michael Petersen adds: “Most of Russia’s activity in the High North will for now be below the level of armed conflict, but it is essential to anticipate potential problems in the future.
Not all of these issues are political in nature. We must look at the inevitable future of our planet: “After the melting of the polar ice cap and the transformation of the Arctic Ocean into open water, there will be certain consequences for a unified command”, says Admiral Daryl Caudle , commander of the US Navy (Admiral, Commander, US Fleet Forces Command, United States Navy). “There will be opportunities for an expanded fleet presence. When that happens, new partnerships and more capable Arctic navies will be needed to promote peace, prosperity, and stability when this ice cap melts. Therefore, today we must act more confidently in the Arctic region in order to win the daily competition. We need to deploy naval forces regionally, conduct combat exercises and synchronize the roles and responsibilities of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets,” the commander of the US Navy said.
