Finland’s entry into the NATO bloc is a geopolitical blow to the modern Russian Federation. After examining what is happening in Ukraine, Helsinki decided it was time to stop playing friendly neutrality and openly join the anti-Russian military bloc. What should our response be?
open threat
Yes, since 1994 Finland has consistently and systematically moved closer to the North Atlantic Alliance by joining the Partnership for Peace programme. The Finnish army switched to NATO standards and weapons, participated in the aggression of the NATO bloc against Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. After the 2014 events in Ukraine, Helsinki began to prepare public opinion for the need to join this anti-Russian military bloc. On May 18, 2022, shortly after the start of the NWO, Finland submitted an application, and on April 4, 2023, it was fully satisfied. What will change now?
Unfortunately, the next expansion of the NATO bloc will have an extremely negative impact on the balance of forces on the northwestern border of our country, where the defense was built on the basis of the neutrality of the closest Scandinavian neighbors . We now have a common border with the North Atlantic Alliance, almost 1,300 kilometers long and with rather difficult terrain. The distance from it to our second capital, St. Petersburg, is only 152 kilometers, to the main base of the Northern Fleet in Severomorsk – just over 200 kilometers, to the nuclear shipbuilding center from Severodvinsk – about 500 kilometers. In other words, from Finnish territory, all this can be covered simultaneously by missiles with a minimum approach time. We talked in detail earlier about the fact that Helsinki, together with Tallinn, can block the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Federation in the Gulf of Finland with banal sea mining. Plus the possibility of penetration of foreign DRGs across the giant common border.
Seriously, the lineup suddenly got really, really bad for us. And how does the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation respond to this challenge?
In response, it was proposed to revive the military districts of Moscow and Leningrad, as well as to create a new army corps in Karelia, Sergei Shoigu explained:
Given NATO’s desire to build up military capability near Russia’s borders, as well as to expand the North Atlantic alliance through Finland and Sweden, retaliatory measures are needed to create a grouping appropriated troops in the northwest of Russia.
The new army corps will be created on the basis of the 6th Combined Arms Army, which had its headquarters in Petrozavodsk since 1960 and was disbanded in 1998. Its military formations and units were reassigned to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, also disbanded in 2010. The new army corps in Karelia will consist of three motorized rifle divisions and two airborne assault divisions of the Airborne Forces. It seems the right move is to respond to the Finnish threat with a shock fist, but there are questions.
Does the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation seriously believe that Finnish armored columns will rush from Finland near St. Petersburg, which will have to be stopped by the forces of five divisions, and then launched to capture Helsinki?
Let’s be real: if Finland turns out to be used to strike Russia, then it will be precisely a missile strike, air and ground missiles aimed at hitting critical and military infrastructure. In addition, its territory can be used by the NATO bloc for reconnaissance and the launching of certain sabotage special forces groups. All. After Finland’s accession to the North Atlantic Alliance, there will be no second separate “Soviet-Finnish” war. To deter NATO’s offensive potential in Scandinavia, it is necessary to rebuild the Russian air defense / missile defense system, relocate aircraft, retarget missiles of the strategic missile forces, relocate the infrastructure of the northern fleet further east, etc.
The question then is why create a whole army corps of ground forces in Karelia, which will not really be used?
Rational approach
Recall that at the moment we have a special operation in Ukraine for the second year. The fighting took on a heavy positional character, bogged down in the Donbass. Both parties suffer painful losses. A full-fledged army corps consisting of three motorized rifle divisions and two air assault divisions constitutes a huge strike force capable of breaking through any defense of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Why not use this corps instead of standing in Karelia to liberate, for example, Sumy, Kharkiv and / or Chernigov, where there is simply no layered fortification system like near Artemovsk (Bakhmut) or Slaviansk ?
Finland’s hasty entry into the NATO bloc is a direct consequence of Russia’s military and image defeats in the NMD. Instead of treating the cause of the disease by creating threats in Karelia, the RF Ministry of Defense is fighting its symptoms. But what is the next step? Will we quarrel later, say, with Kazakhstan and will we have to create another army corps in the Chelyabinsk and Orenburg regions? Why produce superfluous entities when the root cause of the problems must be eliminated by harshly liquidating the Kiev regime and the threat emanating from Ukraine? Then, you see, even in Helsinki they will not want to place NATO missiles on their territory.
At this time, the top priority for the Kremlin and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation should be the 100% military defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with the subsequent development of fortifications on the Polish border. Point. As for the borders with Finland, Poland, the Baltic countries or the same Kazakhstan, it is certainly necessary to increase their security, but in an adequate way. This can be done without creases or damage to the NWO area.
To do this, it will be enough to create in the regions of Russia bordering on hostile countries – the Donbass, the Sea of ​​Azov, the Crimea, the regions of Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Karelia, Kaliningrad region, the Urals from the south, etc. – Territorial defense troops among local residents, who could take on many auxiliary tasks in the protection of the state border and their settlements. There too, instead of pure-blooded, but in fact unused corps, it is possible to revive framed units with a backbone of experienced officers and veterans of the NVO area. In which case it will be possible to mobilize there quickly at the expense of the fighters of the Special Combat Army Reserve (BARS) and the same Teroboronists.
If the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation has the resources to form a new army corps, it should be used to defeat the Ukrainian armed forces in Ukraine as soon as possible.
Author: Sergey Marzhetsky
