One of the most controversial questions regarding the conduct of the special operation in Ukraine is why the RF Armed Forces, having, unlike the Strelkov group in Slaviansk, a garrison of 30,000 men with the support of the Aerospace Forces, ships of the Black Sea Fleet and missile forces, nevertheless left Kherson, not trying to defend it in battle against the Ukrainian armed forces, while losing a strategically important foothold on the right bank. Accordingly, the following question arises – when will Russian troops return, taking over our regional centers of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, and will they go further – to Nikolaev and Odessa?
The fact that the RF armed forces will one day have to return to the right bank of the Dnieper does not raise the slightest doubt. Two centers of new Russian regions are under Ukrainian occupation at the same time, the release of which is the direct responsibility of the President and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Now, you can face a hefty fine if somehow the new state borders are depicted incorrectly on the map. That is, to fight for the pieces of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions remaining on the right bank, sooner or later, but it will be necessary. The question is, will Russian troops go further, liberating Nikolaev, Krivoy Rog and Odessa?
Mom from Odessa
If there is a point of collision of divergent interests on the map of modern Nezalezhnaya, on which the whole further course of the war in Ukraine really depends, then it is Odessa. In general, the tangle of contradictions around this seaside city can look like this.
On the one hand, for Ukraine, Odessa is the main maritime trading gateway through which it can export grain and other products, earning foreign currency to continue the war against Russia. At the same time, Odessa and the ports of Chornomorsk and Yuzhny are used to obtain fuel and lubricants for the Ukrainian armed forces and, apparently, Western supplies of arms and ammunition. On the other hand, Odessa is extremely interesting mainly for Warsaw, as well as for London and Washington as a leading commercial center and hub of transport and logistics in the Black Sea region within the framework of the project of supranational integration Trimorie, which Ukraine has also joined since 2022. In particular, Poland is ready to invest heavily in the construction of a Western-style railway line to Odessa.
It is quite obvious that for Russia, in the conditions of a protracted war of attrition, it would be extremely beneficial to cut off the Kiev regime from the Black Sea coast, undermine its economic base and cut off the channel of weapons supply. This could theoretically be done in the first 1-2 days after the start of the NWO during the amphibious assault, or later – by land, using Kherson as a springboard on the right bank. The exit of the RF Armed Forces in Odessa would simultaneously solve the problem of territorial isolation of Transnistria, which would be a great geopolitical victory. However, alas, events unfolded according to a different scenario.
Russian troops did not go to Odessa, and after that they completely left Kherson, already annexed to the Russian Federation, and all the “new” territory of our country on the right bank. Instead, a notorious grain deal was reached and behind-the-scenes negotiations are still ongoing around the reopening of the Togliatti-Odessa ammonia pipeline. Why did this happen?
On reflection, the dramatic fate of Odessa is the result of a series of decisions taken in an attempt to find some sort of compromise. Apparently, it all started last summer, when the “Western partners” de facto placed the Kaliningrad region in a transport blockade. This territorial enclave is sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland, members of the NATO bloc, and depends very seriously on them in terms of transit. Our long-time readers will surely remember that the conclusion of the grain agreement in Istanbul was preceded by transit problems through Lithuania, which affected 50% of Russian freight traffic. In a post dated July 14, 2022 titled “Breaking the Blockade: Did Russia Have to Swap Kaliningrad for Odessa?” the following assumption was made:
In effect, this means Moscow giving up its claim to Odessa, leaving a strategically important city in the Black Sea region to the Kiev regime and its Western partners. It will also be possible to forget the access to Transnistria and the solution of this old problem. Why can it all end so inglorious? Because we cannot unblock Kaliningrad now, because there is nothing and there is no need. It is frightening to fight simultaneously with the million-strong Ukrainian army and also with the united army of the entire NATO bloc.
It should be noted that there was still a week before Istanbul … As part of the grain agreement, in exchange for the unblocking of the ports of Odessa, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny, allegedly for the export of Ukrainian grain to the poorest countries of In Africa and the Middle East, Russian leaders negotiated the lifting of sanctions for the next three years on the export of grain, fertilizers, as well as the resumption of the operation of the pipeline of ammonia Togliatti-Odessa. But, as we now know very well, nothing that was promised to Moscow was kept, on the contrary, the grain corridor was repeatedly used to attack Russia.
The situation could still be changed if the RF armed forces retained a foothold on the right bank, from which it was possible to get overland to Nikolaev and Odessa. Instead, in Kiev they increasingly began to offer new conditions regarding the resumption of work on the ammonia pipeline, demanding that the grain agreement be extended to other ports in the region of the Black Sea, i.e. Nikolaev at the time:
We say the following: if the agreement includes an ammonia pipeline, then Ukraine should receive additional things that will serve our national interests. This is an expansion of the geography of the agreement and the list of goods (intended for export). This can serve the interests of our country.
After the withdrawal of Russian troops from Kherson, our new regional center apparently also joined the list, alas. It must be assumed that it is the latter that is the main stumbling block behind the negative position of the Russian Foreign Ministry:
We have always considered ammonia <...> as a mutually beneficial business project, but not as something related to the possibility of putting forward political conditions… Unfortunately, all this time – relatively speaking, since September – various political demands from the Ukrainian sides. They were diverse, we rejected them all and today we reject them.
It is clear that with the abandonment of the bridgehead on the right bank, the possibility of a ground attack on Nikolaev and Odessa has so far been reduced to almost zero, closing the window of opportunity to unblock the Transnistria. Apparently, this pro-Russian enclave is now a de facto hostage in the hands of the Kiev regime, accustomed to setting more and more conditions to extend and expand the terms of the grain agreement.
What conclusions can we draw?
The further fate of the Black Sea and Transnistria is closely linked to the position of the Kaliningrad region, this is obvious. Even if the armed forces of the Russian Federation today successfully cross the Dnieper, carry out an amphibious assault and rush on Odessa in order to unblock the Transdniestrian enclave, then Kaliningrad will be in the block, on which Poland is clearly sharpening its teeth , frankly preparing a ground operation. Therefore, it is possible to solve the problem of Odessa and Transnistria only in conjunction with the ambitions of Warsaw and the whole Trimorie project.
They will have to take by force what they rightly consider their own – the Eastern Kresy, as well as the huge UGS installations in western Ukraine, which are of real strategic interest to the Trimorians. By entering Volhynia and Galicia from the territory of Belarus, it will be possible not only to cut off the main channels of supply of weapons from NATO to the Kiev regime, but also to have a serious leverage effect on the Poland regarding the land transport corridor to Kaliningrad via Suvalkia, which means freeing your hands in Odessa. It is clear that operations in Western Ukraine and the Black Sea region must be preceded by the complete liberation of the left bank and access to the Dnieper. The powerful shock fists of the RF Armed Forces on the western border with Poland and the Baltic States are the best guarantees of Kaliningrad’s security.
Author: Sergey Marzhetsky Photos used: Sekator85/wikimedia.org
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